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Abstract 
We employ a spatially disaggregated general equilibrium model of a regional economy that 
incorporates decisions of residents, firms, and developers integrated with a spatially disaggregated 
strategic transportation planning (START) model that features mode, time period, and route choice to 
evaluate economic effects of congestion pricing. 
First, we evaluate the long-run effects of a road-pricing policy based on the integrated model of 
land use, strategic transport, and regional economy (LUSTRE) and compare them with the short-term 
effects obtained from the START model alone. We then look at distributional effects of the policy in 
question and point out differences and similarities in the short run versus the long run. Finally, we analyze 
the mechanisms at the source of the economic and land-use effects induced by the road-pricing policy.  
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Congestion Pricing: Long-Term Economic and Land-Use Effects 
Elena Safirova, Sebastien Houde, D. Abram Lipman, Winston Harrington,  
and Andrew Baglino*
Introduction 
Although in theory congestion tolls are a natural example of Pigouvian taxes that should 
ensure that drivers’ perceived private costs are consistent with the social costs of driving, in 
practice there are only a few examples of cities that actually have implemented road-pricing 
schemes. Following Singapore in the early 1970s and Norwegian toll rings in the mid-1980s, the 
city of London introduced its area toll in February 2003; up until now, it is the most well-known 
example of a large metropolitan area that has implemented congestion pricing.  
There are both theoretical and political reasons why road pricing has not seen more 
widespread use. Even in theory, the efficiency of congestion taxes often is greatly reduced when 
the models reflect more realistic features such as transportation networks, taxes, and the costs of 
toll implementation. Fierce political opposition to congestion tolls partially can be explained by 
the largely unknown distributional effects of road pricing, as well as by concerns over other 
future effects that are difficult to predict. 
Economic evaluations of congestion pricing in general, and for London in particular, 
have predicted that these schemes would be successful. These predictions, however, have been 
based on the evaluation of transportation effects alone; the wider economic impact of such 
schemes has remained uncertain (Vickerman 2005). Tolls will affect travelers’ budget constraints 
and will result not only in mode switching but also in broader changes in the economy that will 
be accompanied by the geographic redistribution of trips. Concerns that the London cordon may 
have negative effects on the economy of the central area, particularly on retail, have in fact 
caused a reduction of the tolling window in response to the concerns of retailers (Santos and 
Shaffer 2004). A counterargument, however, states that the reduced congestion is supposed to 
lower the costs of the downtown businesses, making them more competitive.  
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In the literature, a number of papers have attempted to estimate the effectiveness of 
congestion pricing based on network models, both for first-best marginal congestion pricing and 
for second-best policies that are closer to the tables of policymakers (Verhoef 2002; Yang and 
Huang 1998; Zhang and Yang 2004; Akiyama et al. 2004; Santos 2004). The major criticism of 
such models is that they cannot reflect economic and land-use effects that will follow the 
implementation of congestion pricing.  
At the same time, there is a well-established line of research in the fields of public and 
urban economics describing how congestion tolls will affect the economy of urban areas. In the 
realm of aspatial models, the idea has surfaced that congestion tolls will interact with the rest of 
the tax system and this interaction may lead to unexpected consequences. Parry and Bento 
(2001), for example, have shown that unless the proceeds from the congestion toll are used to 
reduce labor taxes, “optimal” congestion pricing is likely to decrease the welfare of workers 
since it makes them reduce their labor supply.  
In urban economic literature, the standard treatment of congestion tolls is in the context 
of monocentric city models. The results depend on the sophistication of the model, but in all 
cases the major effect of congestion tolls is achieved through the reduction in the physical size of 
the city following the desire of residents to centralize in response to increased transportation 
costs. In the monocentric model context, the welfare gains from congestion pricing measured as 
a percentage of residents’ welfare are usually quite large relative to residents’ incomes, probably 
because the margins of adjustment available to residents are limited to location choice and 
because transportation is modeled in a crude way, with practically all residents of the city driving 
simultaneously on the same road. 
Responding to the criticisms of the monocentric model, a model with endogenous 
location of industry and residents (Anas and Xu 1999) was developed. This model demonstrates 
that the welfare gains due to congestion pricing are likely to be much smaller than what the 
monocentric models predict because agents in the model have more margins of adjustment. On 
the one hand, the residents derive idiosyncratic utility from choosing their preferred home and 
work locations and might be less sensitive to increased transportation costs. On the other hand, 
industry can respond to the imposition of a congestion toll by moving out of the core, leading to 
a more decentralized land-use pattern. As a result, the major response to congestion tolls in this 
type of model is movement of workers/residents and firms toward one another but not 
necessarily toward the center. While this type of model provides intuition about the possible 
effects that are likely to arise in a framework with no predetermined location, the modeling of 
traffic congestion remains coarse. Therefore, as with the other theoretical models described 
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above, this model is good for developing intuition about likely general effects of congestion 
pricing on urban structure. However, the numerical results of this type of model are questionable, 
as the model does not grasp the asymmetric, two-dimensional nature of the city and the 
transportation-related margins of behavioral adjustment such as mode, time-of-day, and route 
choice that can be numerically important.  
One important, realistic feature that usually is lacking in models that deal with traffic 
congestion in the urban framework is agent-type diversity. Most theoretical models treat all 
agents as identical. This simplification keeps these models tractable, while providing major 
behavioral insights. Moreover, in a monocentric model, there is no logical way to represent 
differentiated agents because agents of different incomes will locate in separated rings around 
the central business district (Hartwick et al. 1976), a pattern that contradicts the structure of 
modern cities. The treatment of all agents as identical, however, can skew evaluations of the 
effectiveness of road pricing. Small and Yan (1999), for example, have shown that 
differentiation in agents’ values of time could be an important factor in the effectiveness of 
congestion pricing.  
Another source of literature that could be well suited for comprehensive evaluation of the 
effects of congestion pricing on economy and land use, as well as detailed transportation impact, 
is a vast array of land use-transportation interaction models. While such models employ many 
different techniques (see Wegener 1994; Wilson 1997; Martinez 2000 for review), they usually 
have rather weak behavioral links between land-use and transportation decisions (Waddell 2001). 
Moreover, many of those models are not equipped to represent detailed transportation pricing 
policies (Gupta et al. 2006). 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of congestion pricing in an analytical 
framework that is consistent with behavioral economics and combines features that separately 
were found to be important in the simple theoretical models described above. Specifically, our 
model incorporates detailed transportation modeling and spatially complex, long-term land-use 
and economic impacts, including location decisions by residents and firms. Our modeling 
framework also adds a layer of complexity usually omitted in theoretical models. In particular, it 
features several types of agents, the option for agents not to work, and several market frictions 
(income and real estate taxes, congestible alternative modes of travel). While this complexity is 
computationally costly, it presents an opportunity to look at effects that were not previously 
studied together in the same context. In particular, we would like to know which of the findings 
of the simpler models turns out to be dominant in the more complicated picture. Also, we try to 
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determine if additional complexity produces any effects that are not present in the simpler 
models. 
Because our goal is to use a framework that as much as possible resembles real cities, 
instead of modeling the first-best congestion pricing policy, we model a cordon toll, one of the 
policies that has been described as second-best in previous studies. We choose a cordon toll for 
three reasons. Firstly, our model has an array of market imperfections by design, making the 
derivation and calculation of the first-best policy beyond our computational capacity. Secondly, 
cordon tolls have been implemented recently, and one of the likely reasons is that this form of 
pricing is simple enough to keep the implementation costs down and at the same time be 
understood by travelers. Thirdly, cordon tolls have been analyzed extensively in the literature 
and in several contexts have been found to be close second-best forms of congestion pricing 
(Kraus 1989; Mun 2003; Mun 2004; Santos 2004; Verhoef 2004).  
To best understand the economic and land-use effects in our model, we first model a 
cordon policy in a transportation model with no land use and analyze general impacts of the 
policy. Then, we model the same policy in an integrated model of transportation and land use 
and compare the impacts. Because we employ the same transportation module in both 
approaches, it is relatively easy to distinguish the short-term transportation-only effects from the 
long-term effects in the form of land-use and other economic effects. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe our model and 
briefly characterize the baseline equilibrium of the regional economy. Section 3 contains the 
details of our cordon policy modeling. Section 4 is a comparison of the simulation results 
between the transportation-only and the integrated models, respectively named START and 
LUSTRE. In addition to reporting aggregate results, we describe in detail the effects of the 
downtown cordon on transportation, residential patterns, and the production sector. Section 5 
discusses the dependence of results on key parameters and compares the long-run optimal toll 
with the short-run one. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.  
Model Description  
In this section, we briefly describe both modules of LUSTRE (START and RELU), 
explain how both can be used to evaluate welfare implications of transportation policies, provide 
a short description of the integrated model, and characterize the Baseline equilibrium used in this 
paper. 
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START 
The START modeling suite was developed by MVA Consultancy and has been applied 
to a range of urban centers in the United Kingdom, including Birmingham, Edinburgh, and South 
England (Coombe et al. 1997; May et al. 1992). More recently, this model was calibrated for 
Washington, DC, and used to conduct policy simulations of gasoline taxes (Nelson et al. 2003), 
HOT lanes (Safirova et al. 2003), and congestion pricing (Safirova et al. 2004; Safirova et al. 
2005), as well as to compute network-based marginal congestion costs of urban transportation 
(Safirova and Gillingham 2003) and evaluate the benefits of public transit (Nelson et al. 2006).1
START is designed to predict the transportation-related outcomes of different 
transportation policies where policies refer to combinations of different transport elements, 
which in broad terms encompass changes in road or public transit capacity (e.g., new 
infrastructure), operating conditions, and tolls, fares, and other fees. Although most of the model 
components are conventional, the suite features a limited number of zones and an aggregated 
representation of the supply side combined with a very detailed demand side. An important 
advantage of the model is its relatively short run time, which provides an opportunity to conduct 
and compare a large number of policy simulations to better understand their potential 
consequences. 
The Washington START model has 40 travel zones with three stylized transportation 
links in each zone (inbound, outbound, and circumferential) and a number of other “special” 
links that represent highway segments and bridges. Six main corridors (I-270, I-95, and US-50 in 
Maryland and I-66, I-95, and VA-267 in Northern Virginia) connect the outer suburbs to the 
central region within the circular I-495/I-95 ring, which is known as the Beltway (Figure 1a). 
The rail network combines the Washington Metrorail system and suburban heavy rail systems 
(Maryland Rail Commuter [MARC] and Virginia Railway Express [VRE]). Rail travel occurs on 
routes, which are modeled as series of rail links; rail links represent segments of the rail network. 
Bus travel is represented by a highly stylized route network, with bus accessibility in any zone 
determined by the density of stops, frequency of service, and reported bus travel times. Transit 
crowding costs and parking search costs are explicitly included in the model. The model also 
accounts for existing high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes on I-95, I-395, I-66, and VA-267 in 
Northern Virginia, as well as I-70 and US-50 in Maryland. Moreover, we recently have made 
                                                 
1 We also refer to Washington implementation as Washington START. 
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several improvements to transit modeling, such as incorporation of park-and-ride facilities for 
rail trips, placing buses on links used by other on-road vehicles (so that buses are affected by and 
contribute to road congestion), and more detailed treatment of rail network.2
This rather aggregated supply-side representation is combined with a detailed demand-
side structure. The model features multiple agent types (up to eight in the current 
implementation,) that can differ by income or any demographic characteristic. There are six trip 
purposes: home-based work (HBW), home-based shopping (HBS), home-based other (HBO), 
non-home-based work (NHBW), non-home-based other (NHBO), and freight. Home-based trips 
either originate or terminate at home. The model distinguishes four travel modes: single 
occupancy vehicle (SOV), HOV, transit (which has two sub-modes: bus and rail), and non-
motorized (walk and bike). It also represents three time periods: morning peak, afternoon peak, 
and off peak.  
START takes home-based work trips and freight trip demands by demographic segment 
and residential location as exogenous and trips for other home-based purposes as endogenous but 
highly inelastic. Travel decisions are modeled as a nested logit tree. The utility functions at each 
nest are linear in generalized costs (the combined monetary and time costs of travel). The value 
of time is a function of the travelers’ wage rate and varies by trip purpose. Crowding on public 
transit routes also induces an artificial time penalty, which is tantamount to an increased travel 
time. For home-based trip purposes, agents choose in successive nests whether or not to generate 
a trip (for purposes with endogenous demand), then destination, mode, time of day, and route.3  
The decisions are modeled by a nested logit structure, with the utility for each nest i given by 
i ii UA p β =−
                                                
, where Ai is a calibrated value representing idiosyncratic preferences, β is an 
exogenous response parameter (indexed by trip purpose and nest-level), and pi is a generalized 
cost of travel that combines time and money costs explicitly modeled in the supply module. Non-
home-based trip demands are an explicit function of home-based trip numbers at the model level. 
Agents choose time of day and route in successive nests. 
The overall structure of START is an iterative one. The trips computed in the demand 
module are loaded on to the supply network. The supply network uses the loads to compute costs 
 
2 See Nelson (2006) for more details on transit modeling improvements. 
3 For shopping trips, the mode nest is above the destination nest. 
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of travel, which are passed back to the demand module. This process iterates until the costs of 
travel converge to equilibrium values. 
In order to integrate START with the RELU model, we made several modifications to 
stand-alone START. First, for the trip purposes that are explicitly modeled in RELU (home-
based work and shopping trips) the trip generation and destination nests are removed. Instead, in 
LUSTRE, RELU generates trip demands and passes these numbers to START (we discuss this in 
more detail in the integration part of this section). Second, there is a mismatch between the 
definition of shopping trips in RELU and START; RELU shopping trips include trips to service 
locations (doctor’s office, lawyer, etc.), while START trips do not. We let each model work with 
its own definition and make necessary conversions in the Bridge. 
RELU  
A Regional Economy and Land Use (RELU) model was developed by Alex Anas and 
Elena Safirova with the purpose of creating a theoretically sound modeling tool for policy 
analysis. RELU is a spatially disaggregated computable general equilibrium model of a regional 
economy that is grounded in microeconomic theory and can be used for comprehensive welfare 
analysis. By design, in order to shed light on the nature of interactions between land use, 
transportation, and other forces in the regional economy. 
In its modeling philosophy, RELU follows the structure of Anas-Xu (1999), although 
several new features (presence of several agent types, explicit possibility of unemployment, 
modeling housing and building stocks, income and real estate taxes) position the model to tackle 
complex realistic problems. In its present calibration, the model features four groups of 
consumers/workers and four primary industries and construction/demolition industries, as well as 
decisionmaking by landlords and developers. A mathematical description of RELU is provided 
in the Mathematical Appendix A.  
Welfare Measurement 
Both models described above have a natural way to measure welfare changes resulting 
from policies. In START, consumer surplus can be computed in a manner consistent with the 
nested logit tree underlying the decisionmaking process. At each nest, consumer surplus is 
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There are several problems with using this approach in the context of the integrated 
model. First, because separate welfare measures are computed for each trip purpose as opposed 
to each agent class (i.e., consumer surplus is computed per trip, not per person), a judgment may 
have to be made about the relative value of various travel purposes. Second, the model does not 
provide an easy way to compute the marginal utility of money for the travelers making trip 
choices. Third, in order to compute the social surplus of a particular policy, one has to make 
assumptions about the marginal costs of public funds and about government efficiency when 
spending public money. Nevertheless, if particular (even ad hoc) assumptions are made, the 
model provides a relatively straightforward way to evaluate the welfare associated with 
simulated policies.  
On the other hand, RELU provides a way to compute the economic welfare of 
consumers/residents without requiring the modeler to make the same ad hoc decisions. In RELU, 
utility is agent-based and, therefore, valuation of travel purposes is internalized. RELU’s utility 
function is log-linear in agent’s income and, therefore, one can evaluate marginal utility of 
income for each choice. Finally, RELU explicitly treats income taxes and, therefore, can 
compute marginal costs of public funds.  
Since the discrete consumer choices in RELU are multinomial logit, the welfare measure 
in the model can be written as: 











          (2) 
In LUSTRE, we adopt the RELU definition of welfare measurement. In fact, the structure 
of the integrated model stipulates that RELU and, therefore, its welfare measure serves as a tool 
for the comprehensive evaluation of the changes in the economy, including the transportation 
sector, and for the most part this evaluation is indeed comprehensive4.  
                                                 
4 However, in LUSTRE, trip purposes that are not explicitly modeled in RELU are ignored. 
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Furthermore, because indirect utility function in RELU (U
~
) is a function of endogenous 
economic and transportation variables, we can decompose the welfare change to evaluate how 
each of those variables affects the welfare.  
The decomposition of the welfare gains is approximated using the first-order Taylor 
polynomial for the welfare measure (i.e., the sum of the partial derivatives of the welfare 
function, times the variation, from the baseline to the simulation, of the endogenous economic 
and transportation variables). Following this approach, we get a formula for the decomposition 
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In (3), the first term represents welfare gains from the changes in toll revenues 
redistributed (surplus of transit fares is included); the second term accounts for changes in real 
estate value; the third term represents changes in wages; the fourth term accounts for changes in 
retail prices; the fifth term comes from changes in rents; the sixth term represents changes in 
commuting costs; the seventh term stands for changes in costs of shopping trips; and finally the 
last term is a correction term due the first-order approximation. The mathematical appendix B 
provides details on the formulation of each term.  
Model Integration 
In LUSTRE, RELU and START are integrated at the level of the individual agent and 
this feature makes the integrated program well-suited for testing behavioral response to either 
policies or economic scenarios. Moreover, this integration and the fact that RELU and START 
operate at the same level of geographic disaggregation make the integrated model very precise in 
passing information between the two modules. The integration is implemented using an auxiliary 
program Bridge that assists in data exchange between the two models by aggregating and 
disaggregating them as needed. To help the reader better understand the mechanism of 
interactions between the two models, we will describe one loop of the iterative procedure. 
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First, RELU takes time costs and monetary costs of travel, disaggregated by skill level, 
trip purpose, and origin-destination pair, as given. The RELU simulation yields, in addition to 
other land-use and economic effects, trip demands at the same level of disaggregation given 
above. The Bridge disaggregates those trip demands further by mode, time period, and route, 
based on their calibrated distribution, to provide START with an initial guess of this further 
disaggregation of trip demands. The Bridge also translates RELU-determined wage rates into a 
value of time for START. START minimizes travel costs at the level of the individual trip. In so 
doing, it iteratively redistributes trips among routes, time periods, and modes, and in each 
iteration computes generalized costs of travel. START terminates when the costs of travel 
converge to equilibrium values. At this point, the Bridge aggregates the equilibrium generalized 
travel costs over routes, time periods, and modes; splits the costs into time and money elements;5 
and passes this new set of transportation costs to RELU. With these new transportation costs, 
RELU finds new equilibrium land-use and economic values, including new travel demands and 
wages. The Bridge processes these new travel demands and wages as described above, START 
runs again, and so on. The process continues until both trip demands and costs converge to 
values that do not change (more than a specified tolerance) between iterations. 
Although run times depend on the policy, for the simulations presented in this paper, the 
average run time for the full LUSTRE model was approximately 2 hours on a Pentium 4 
(2.60GHz) with 1.5GB RAM.  
Model Calibration 
The integrated model is calibrated to the year 2000 for the Washington, DC, metropolitan 
area. The population of potential workers (active population) has been divided into four groups 
(approximate quartiles), with each group representing a different skill level.  
To calibrate the model, a variety of data sources have been used. Data on 
residential/workplace patterns, wages, and incomes were extracted from the Census 
Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) and supplemented by the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey. Prices and production volumes are based on data obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; housing consumption data and residential rents came from the American Housing 
Survey; and land-use data were collected from the local and county governments in the 
                                                 
5 In the present version of the model, all changes in generalized costs are reflected in monetary costs of travel. 
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metropolitan area. On the transportation side, we merged the data from the CTPP with data from 
the 1994 Travel Survey, scaled up to the 2000 levels of travel demand. The Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments (COG) Version 1 transportation planning model and the 
data from aerial photography (COG 1999) were used to calibrate road link speeds.  
In the calibrated Baseline equilibrium, our area of study has an active population of about 
4,139,000 residents, of whom 76.7 percent are employed (Table 1a). From the population 
distribution in the baseline, one can see that Washington, DC, is a good candidate for cordon-
style congestion pricing because the Downtown core is a net employer; across all skill level 
quartiles, the number of people employed in this zone is several times higher than the number of 
residents (Table 1b). 
In the Baseline equilibrium, consumers spend 20 percent of their net incomes (Table 2) 
on housing and the rest on consumer goods and services. State and federal income tax rates range 
from 14.3 percent for the lowest skill level to 31.5 percent for the highest. Wages vary somewhat 
across the area of study, but average hourly wages for the four quartiles range between $6.80 and 
$47.00.6
The Downtown core, being the workplace of 13 percent of workers in the region (Tables 
1a and b), serves as the destination of more than 15 percent of morning commute trips and 11 
percent of off-peak commute trips (Table 3a). On the other hand, the lion’s share of rail trips (69 
percent) have as their destination the Downtown core (Table 3b). The role of the city core as a 
shopping destination is much less prominent, with only about 1 percent of shopping trips 
destined for Downtown locations (Table 3a). 
Policy Description 
In this paper, we compare model results produced by simulating a transportation policy 
using START (the transportation-only model) with those produced by simulating the same policy 
using the integrated LUSTRE model. The policy we look at is a cordon toll that covers a small 
downtown core area in Washington, DC (see Figure 1b). It is applied during the morning rush 
period (6.30 a.m. to 9.30 a.m.) to drivers entering the area inside the cordon from outside of it, 
including those who pass through on the way to a destination outside the cordon. 
                                                 
6 While a full characterization of the baseline equilibrium and a technical description of the calibration procedure are 
beyond the scope of this paper, a technical paper describing those details is available from the authors.  
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In addition to the reasons given in the introduction for our choice of policy, studying a 
cordon toll offers a key technical advantage over many other types of congestion pricing (such as 
link-based pricing schemes) as a way of investigating the economic and land-use effects of 
transportation policies in that it is tied to a specific geographic location. This property facilitates 
interpretation and analysis of possible mechanisms by which these effects occur. 
We determine the societal welfare-optimizing cordon price using the START model only 
and then run the integrated model using this START-determined optimal cordon price.  
Aggregate Results 
Figure 2a shows that in LUSTRE, the total welfare gains achieved at different toll levels 
are in all cases higher than when only transportation effects are considered (START only). The 
optimal toll level increases from 228 cents (2000 dollars) under START to 470 cents under 
LUSTRE. For a toll of 228 cents, the amount of toll collected increases from START to 
LUSTRE by $0.2M (0.71 percent) annually, and surplus transit fare collections resulting from 
the cordon increase by $0.6M (4.96 percent) (Table 4a). These fare and toll collection changes 
demonstrate overall differences in transportation decisions under the two models. The size of 
these changes, however, is small relative to the total increase in welfare gains under LUSTRE 
versus START, which increase fivefold for a toll of 228 cents.  
A closer look at the results shows that accounting for the economic and land-use effects 
also affects the distribution of welfare gains (Figure 2b). In START, the cordon policy appears 
somewhat progressive; the lowest quartile group sees the largest welfare gain, while the two 
median quartile groups suffer from net welfare losses. For the most affluent quartile, the sign of 
the welfare change is ambiguous. As shown in Table 4b, at the optimal toll level they enjoy a 
welfare gain, while for higher tolls, this group sees a rapid decrease of benefits and can be the 
most adversely affected by the road pricing (Figure 2b). Under LUSTRE, all groups enjoy 
welfare gains, but for tolls below 500 cents, the welfare gains are largest for the most affluent 
quartile. Individuals in the first quartile group still enjoy higher gains than the second and third 
quartiles. For tolls higher than 500 cents, they also gain more than the fourth quartile.  
Identifying factors that cause increased welfare gains under LUSTRE versus START is 
difficult because the effects of the policy are entangled in a series of feedback loops between the 
transportation and the economic modules. However, the welfare decomposition allows us to 
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estimate the effects of each of the key economic variables. Table 5a presents the decomposed 
welfare change terms evaluated for a cordon toll of 228 cents.7  
The first term to note in Table 5a is the “Toll Revenue Redistributed” component. This 
term reflects the size of the welfare gains due solely to the redistribution of the toll revenue and 
additional transit fares collected, in the form of additional unearned income. We ignore here 
welfare losses resulting from the loss of disposable income due to paying the tolls, as well as 
other transportation and economic impacts. The values of this term for different quartiles are, of 
course, closely tied to the redistribution scheme formulated in the policy. Table 5a shows that the 
value is greatest for the first and fourth quartiles, respectively. That is, these groups experience 
the greatest welfare gains from revenue redistribution. For the lowest quartile group, this gain 
dominates all other effects, but this relative dominance decreases with increasing affluence. The 
redistribution scheme is thus progressive and ensures that the lowest quartile benefits from 
higher tolls.  
While the welfare gains from toll revenue redistribution are induced by the formulation 
of the policy, changes in real estate values, wages, prices of retail goods, and rents are the 
explicit economic and land-use effects of the cordon policy. From Table 5a, we draw three 
important conclusions related to these effects. Firstly, they are significant compared to the 
transportation terms. Therefore, LUSTRE brings new information omitted by START. Secondly, 
except for real estate value, the magnitudes of these welfare terms are positively correlated with 
the income of the representative agents; the economic and land-use effects are most significant 
for wealthier individuals. The real estate value term is an outlier because each quartile group 
owns a share of the stocks in fixed proportion and thus the relative importance across quartiles of 
this variable is exogenous.  Thirdly, while changes in real estate value and wages contribute to 
welfare gains, changes in prices of retail goods and in residential rents lead to welfare losses.  
Turning to the transportation variables, we see that the changes in commuting costs have 
important and adverse welfare effects. Changes in shopping costs, by contrast, have much 
smaller negative (or even positive, in one case) effects on welfare. As we convert all the savings 
in travel time resulting from decreased congestion to monetary units, we can conclude that the 
reduction of congestion under the downtown cordon does not, on its own, cancel out the higher 
                                                 
7 To allow comparisons of the transportation results between START and LUSTRE, our interpretations of the results 
focus on cordon policy that corresponds to the optimal toll pricing found under START.  
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monetary costs of commuting trips. However, if we account for the lump-sum redistribution of 
the toll revenue collected, the gains are positive. As transportation-induced welfare change and 
lump sum redistribution of revenues are precisely the welfare variables incorporated in START, 
these positive welfare gains corroborate the positive welfare gains found in START alone. 
In the rest of this section, we explore more deeply the causes and consequences of the 
results described above. First, we look at the transportation decisions to explain the changes in 
traveling costs and their effects. We then perform a similar analysis for the wages by looking at 
the labor marker, for the rents by looking at the housing market, and for the prices of goods by 
looking at the production sector. Finally, we analyze the real estate market.  
Transportation  
The cordon toll initially only affects transportation decisions. Facing higher costs to 
access the downtown, individuals have an incentive to change their route, the time of day during 
which they travel, and their mode of transportation.  
Table 6a shows the importance of the substitution across time periods induced by the toll. 
Individuals traveling to the downtown substitute away from morning peak travel, when the 
cordon is in effect, to afternoon and off-peak travel. A similar, but smaller, substitution occurs 
for trips to other zones. Thus, the cordon toll reduces congestion during the morning peak but 
increases congestion during other periods, although to a substantially lesser extent. Across all 
time periods, the number of trips to the downtown core decreases more under LUSTRE than 
under START, although both changes are small (0.27 percent vs. 0.028 percent, respectively). 
This finding can be explained by changes in residential and industrial location under LUSTRE 
that are not considered in START. 
Table 6b shows the magnitude of the shift toward public transit and high occupancy 
vehicles. This shift contributes to a reduction in the number of cars on the transportation 
network, which leads to better traffic quality. On the other hand, greater use of public transit puts 
increasing pressure on the system; crowding and waiting times increase. 
Still, the adjustments in transportation decisions under the cordon overall result in time 
savings, particularly for the residents at the center of the study area (Figure 3). However, when 
the amount of time saved is converted into monetary units and subtracted from the additional 
costs imposed by the toll, the net costs of traveling from any given zone, except the downtown, 
increase (Figure 6a). This figure reflects the negative welfare impact of transportation effects 
discussed in the “Aggregate Results” section but also provides an insight into the geographic 
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distribution of the welfare loss. Under the cordon policy, residents of the downtown are the only 
group to enjoy net benefits directly from reduced costs of travel.  
Looking at changes in transportation costs by destination instead of origin, we see that 
the downtown and surrounding zones see the greatest increase in transportation cost (Figure 6b). 
This is because the toll affects travelers who go to and through the downtown. Traveling to zones 
farther from the cordon becomes less costly due to reduced congestion.  
Interestingly, the changes in costs vary substantially by purpose. Commuting costs 
increase for residents of all zones (Figure 4a), even for downtown residents, despite their overall 
decrease in travel costs. As a destination, the downtown sees the greatest increase in commuting 
costs (Figure 4b). On the other hand, net shopping travel costs decrease for residents of 
numerous zones, quite significantly in some cases (Figure 5a). As a destination, the downtown is 
one zone to see a shopping travel costs decrease (Figure 5b). There are two reasons why the toll 
decreases, or only slightly increases, the costs of travel for shopping trips but not for working 
trips. First, shopping trips are more likely to take place during the off peak period, while work 
trips predominantly are made during the peak periods. Therefore, shoppers are less burdened by 
the toll than commuters are, but they enjoy the decrease in congestion resulting from the cordon 
policy. Second, shopping trips tend to have destinations near their origins. For the residents of 
the downtown, the fact that they shop primarily within their zone, which sees the greatest 
decrease in congestion, and not during the morning peak, explains why their shopping travel 
costs decrease enough to outweigh their increased commuting costs.  
In conclusion, the cordon toll brings some time savings, but leads to an overall increase 
in the cost of travel after the monetary cost of the tolls is accounted for. However, the magnitude 
of the burden varies by zone, and downtown residents experience a net decrease in travel costs. 
The increase in travel costs is a greater burden for commuters than for shoppers, explaining the 
negative welfare impact of commuting costs changes and mixed welfare impacts of shopping 
travel cost increases in Table 5a.  
Labor Market 
The representation of the labor market in LUSTRE implies that changes in wages can be 
caused by a change in the labor supply or by changes in production prices. Both these factors 
impact marginal productivity of labor that corresponds to the wages.  
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Under the present cordon policy, a combination of the labor supply response and changes 
in production prices lead to higher wages8. The increase is most significant in the downtown and 
surrounding zones (Figure 7). Individuals with lower skill levels experience slightly greater wage 
increases than do high-skilled individuals.   
To explain these findings we analyze the three primary variables upon which individuals 
in LUSTRE base their choice of work location or choice not to work. One is unearned income. 
An increase in unearned income causes a reduction in the opportunity cost of unemployment, 
which in turn leads to a reduction in labor supply. This effect will be particularly important for 
the individuals of the lower quartile groups because, for a given increase in unearned income, 
they see the greatest decrease in the marginal utility of income and thus the greatest drop in 
opportunity cost of unemployment. The second factor is wages, which vary by workplace. 
Higher wages increase the opportunity cost of unemployment. Our model does not allow the 
labor supply curve of an individual to be backward bending (because individuals do not derive 
utility from leisure). Higher wages are then always an incentive to work. The third factor is the 
commuting cost, which includes time and monetary components. As with wages, commuting 
costs vary by workplace, and consequently influence workers’ work location decisions as well as 
their decision whether or not to work. A reduction in congestion in a given area acts as an 
incentive to work there, while a toll serves as a disincentive. Finally, it should be noted that the 
representation of the economy within a general equilibrium framework means that any variable 
that affects budget constraints of agents also indirectly influences labor supply. We do not 
analyze these indirect influences on the labor market in this paper.  
Under the present cordon toll, the total number of employed individuals decreases across 
all quartile groups, creating a scarcity in the labor force and helping to drive the wage increases. 
This decrease in labor supply can be explained by the fact that the lump-sum redistribution of the 
toll revenue constitutes an increase in unearned income, decreasing the opportunity cost of 
unemployment. As expected, the greatest shift towards unemployment occurs in the lowest 
quartile, followed by the second quartile, and so on.  
From Figure 7, we also observe that the largest wage increases are concentrated in the 
central zones. Figure 4b explains this pattern. We see from this figure that the spatial distribution 
of wage increases is similar to that of the increases in commuting costs. Commuting costs 
                                                 
8 Here the gross wages are reported to reflect the marginal productivity of labor. 
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increase the most in the central zones, diverting workers from these zones, which leads to the 
greatest reduction in labor supply. The competitive economy is responding by increasing wage 
rates there.  
As we observe in Table 5a, these wage increases are responsible for a large share of 
welfare gains. Actually, except for the lowest skill level quartile, changes in wages are the 
dominant effect that leads to positive welfare gains for each quartile group.  
Increases in wages and unearned income outweigh the increase in commuting costs. As a 
result, individuals, except those who stop working in response to the cordon, experience net 
income increases under the cordon (Table 7a) and consume more housing and goods and services 
(Table 7b). These increases are consistent with the gains of welfare observed for these 
individuals.  
However, many individuals do, in fact, stop working as a result of the cordon. Thus, 
while workers and non-workers consume more under the cordon than in the baseline, enough 
individuals retire so that total housing space consumption increases by only 0.014 percent and 
total goods consumption actually decreases by 0.0058 percent. The general equilibrium effects of 
the increase of wages on the consumption markets are then quite modest.  
In conclusion, the response of the labor market to the cordon toll positively contributes to 
the welfare gains. The toll leads to the reduction in labor supply that in turn drives up wages. 
These higher wages, which help compensate for the shift toward unemployment and the 
increased commuting costs, are responsible for a large share of welfare gains. The magnitude of 
the welfare gains in LUSTRE is closely tied to the elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
changes in unearned income and commuting costs. Sensitivity analysis will show, however, that 
for different parameterizations of labor supply, welfare changes remain positive 
Housing Market and Residential Pattern  
In LUSTRE, the responses of the housing market and residence patterns to the cordon toll 
are intertwined. Under any transportation policy affecting transportation costs, individuals facing 
increased commuting or shopping travel costs relocate. This initial movement brings about 
changes in the housing market, which has a feedback effect on residential patterns.  
Figures 8a and 6a show the spatial correlation between shifts in residential patterns and 
changes in transportation costs under the cordon toll. The downtown sees the greatest increase in 
population because the best way to avoid the cordon toll is to move inside the cordoned area. As 
reported earlier, the residents of the downtown are the only agents in the model to enjoy lower 
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costs of travel. Conversely, the zones just outside the cordon have the greatest decrease in 
population, as their residents experience the greatest increase in costs of travel (Figure 6a). In 
zones far away from the downtown, the effect of the cordon on residence patterns is smaller. 
Nevertheless, some zones swell noticeably because they absorb migrants from the adversely 
affected zones.  
The impact of the shift in residence patterns on the housing market is captured by the 
rents and to a lesser extent by the stock of housing assets. Rents change consistently with the 
movement in population (Figure 8b). Rents increase in the downtown core; but for zones just 
outside the downtown, the decrease in population is accompanied by lower rents. These lower 
rents benefit the residents and partly compensate for the increased costs of travel observed in 
these zones. The opposite occurs for residents of zones receiving the migrants. Overall, changes 
in rents adversely affect individuals of all skill levels as reported in Table 5a.  
Production Sector 
According to the production function of LUSTRE, production prices are a function of 
business rents, wages, and the costs of intermediate goods net of freight costs. Each of these 
input costs is zone-specific. Thus, in addition to choosing their input mix, firms can also relocate 
to minimize production costs. On the demand side, the pattern of relocation of consumers also 
influences firms’ locations. The demand for the outputs of primary industries other than retail 
comes from all primary industries, while the only consumers of the retail sector output are 
shoppers. This characterization of the production has important implications, as we will see 
below.  
Figure 9a shows changes in real outputs for the retail sector, while Figure 10b shows 
changes in real outputs for the other three primary industries combined. As noted earlier, the 
overall consumption of retail goods and services decreases slightly with respect to the baseline. 
In Figure 9a, we observe that the retail sector experiences a small decline in outputs in the 
downtown core (0.008 percent). The zones around the core and the ones in the eastern part of the 
study area (Maryland) experience a similar decline, which is even less pronounced in the zones 
in the western part (Virginia). As it turns out, the decrease in output in this sector leads to a 
lower demand for intermediate goods from the other primary industries. The spatially 
disaggregate changes in other primary industries follow a different pattern from retail. The 
primary industries experience a larger decline in output in the core (0.036 percent), a small 
decline in zones immediately surrounding the core, and an increase in all other zones  
(Figure 9b). 
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The relocation of the non-retail industries is largely influenced by the changes in wages. 
In effect, the larger appreciation in wages in the more central zones leads to a greater increase in 
production costs in these zones. In response, industries relocate further from the core, in 
particular where wage increases are smallest (Figure 7). On the other hand, by moving further 
from the central business district, these industries experience higher shipping costs, which 
provide a disincentive to move. Also, industrial rents could affect reallocation decisions. 
However, industrial rents slightly increase in all zones rather uniformly in a range of 0.02 and 
0.033 percent, providing little incentive to move. Therefore, the changes in shipping costs and 
rents pale in comparison to the difference in wage increases between the downtown core and the 
outer zones, leading to the overall pattern of relocation shown in Figure 9b.  
The movement of industry towards outer zones implies an increase in demand for labor in 
those zones, resulting in a larger wage increase in those outer zones than would have otherwise 
occurred. This may have helped distribute the welfare gains to outer zones. Moreover, less 
geographical flexibility among those industries could have resulted in larger overall declines in 
production, which would have in turn implied smaller increases in wages. 
The location of retail activity, on the other hand, is also driven by individuals’ preferred 
shopping locations. As noted before, individuals tend to shop near their place of residence, so 
retail firms cannot easily move out of the downtown core, because so many people live near 
central Washington. This dependence on customer convenience explains why retail production 
decreases less than the output of other primary industries in the core downtown (0.008 percent 
vs. 0.036 percent). By comparing Figures 7 and 9c, we observe that retail price inflation is 
greatest in zones with the highest wage increases. As retail firms are largely unable to relocate to 
avoid the higher costs of labor, retail sees overall large supply-side driven price increases. This 
observation helps explain the welfare loss carried by price changes shown in Table 5a. The richer 
quartiles are the most affected simply because they consume the most.  
Real Estate 
In the competitive representation of the economy in LUSTRE, the value of real estate is 
affected by rents. In the present simulation, increases in residential and industrial rents translate 
into an appreciation of the value of the real estate assets. Figure 10a shows that all zones see an 
increase in the value of real estate except for some peripheral zones around the downtown core.  
Developers could react to these higher values by increasing the stock of assets. However, 
the present increases in value are too small to be an incentive for development of new buildings. 
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Figure 10b shows that the changes in the stock of residential housing are small, and Figure 10c 
shows for the same for commercial and industrial stocks.  
We can conclude that the cordon toll affects the value of the real estate but does not 
change the structural composition of the stocks. The increase in real estate values brings positive 
welfare gains to the individuals because they own a proportion of the assets.  
Sensitivity Tests 
As with all simulation exercises, the robustness of the results presented above depends on 
the details of the model and the design of the policy. In our case, three areas of potential 
sensitivity deserve particular attention. 
First, regarding the design of the policy, we have seen that the scheme for the lump-sum 
redistribution of the toll revenue has important implications for the distribution of the welfare 
gains across four quartile groups. Therefore, it is a legitimate question of how robust the welfare 
gains are with respect to redistribution schemes.  
Second, we have shown that the higher welfare gains achieved under LUSTRE than 
under START predominantly are due to the response of the labor market—more precisely, the 
increase in wages. However, this increase is dependent on the calibrated elasticity for the labor 
supply. Therefore, it is important to examine the robustness of the welfare gains with respect to 
this elasticity. 
Third, our analysis of economic and land-use effects has focused on a particular toll 
pricing, 228 cents, which was the optimal attained with START. Under LUSTRE, the optimal 
toll, 470 cents, is more than twice as high. One might then ask if the qualitative nature of the land- 
use and transportation responses to the cordon policy under such a different toll would remain 
the same using the LUSTRE optimal.    
Lump-Sum Redistribution Scheme 
To test the sensitivity of the welfare gains with respect to the redistribution scheme, we 
have simulated an unrealistic, but illustrative, scheme where the revenues collected under the toll 
are given entirely to one particular quartile group. We have tested this scheme for each quartile 
group; table 8a presents the total welfare gain achieved.  
As discussed earlier, each of the representative agents of the quartile groups has a 
different marginal utility of income. In terms of welfare, one dollar given in a lump sum to the 
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poorer quartile has more value than a dollar given to the richer quartile. Thus, one might have 
expected that a lump-sum redistribution that favors the lower quartile group would bring the 
highest welfare gains. However, this is not the case. Redistributing the revenue to the second 
quartile or the third quartile only brings higher welfare gains than giving revenue to the first 
quartile. The reason for this unexpected finding is that the redistribution scheme influences 
welfare gains not only by providing extra income but also by inducing different economic, land 
use, and transportation effects, depending on which quartile group receives the toll revenue.  
 Table 8b shows that the size of the effects induced solely by the redistribution can be 
significant. In fact, the feedback effects within the transportation-regional economy can bring 
significant welfare gains to groups that do not receive any lump-sum transfer. In the present case, 
the richest quartile is particularly sensitive to these feedback effects. This is consistent with our 
previous finding, where we observed that this quartile is the most sensitive to economic and land- 
use effects. 
In sum, the sensitivity tests suggest that the results presented in the previous section are 
highly sensitive to the design of the policy. Conclusions about how the regional economy reacts 
to a particular transportation policy cannot be extrapolated without a careful examination of the 
policy formulation.  
Labor Supply Elasticity 
In LUSTRE, the elasticity of the labor supply is determined by the dispersion parameter 
f λ  of the multinomial logit choice probabilities. A lower value of  f λ assigns less weight to the 
individuals’ idiosyncratic utilities and more weight to the price-like variables in the choice 
probabilities. In other words, individuals become more sensitive to the set of prices they face and 
rely less on their idiosyncratic preferences.  
Under the cordon policy, a lower  f λ  would then mean that individuals are more likely to 
become unemployed. This greater reduction in the labor supply should translate in a greater 
increase in wages. As we have seen in the previous section, wage increases lead to the bulk of 
the welfare gains in LUSTRE. Thus, lower f λ should bring higher welfare gains and the opposite 
for higher  f λ .  
Sensitivity tests confirm this intuition; a decrease in  f λ  leads to higher unemployment, 
higher wages, and greater welfare gains. The magnitude of the changes is particularly important 
for a reduction of  f λ  value. For a decrease of four percent of its initial value, the total welfare 
gains increase by more than 70 percent relative to the original simulation. At the same time, the 
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qualitative nature of the results is preserved. For an increase in  f λ  value, we observe the 
opposite: the overall welfare gain decreases, as expected. LUSTRE, however, is less sensitive to 
an increase in  f λ . For a 15 percent increase, the overall welfare gains decrease by only 7 
percent.  
The magnitude of the welfare gains observed in LUSTRE, therefore, is sensitive to the 
parameterization of the labor market. However, the sensitivity is skewed. In effect, welfare gains 
are quite robust with respect to higher values of the parameter  f λ . Consequently, the welfare 
gains obtained in the original simulation are unlikely to be much lower that the ones computed 
but can easily be higher.  
Toll Levels 
When facing higher toll levels, individuals have greater incentives to alter their 
transportation behavior. Subsequently, a higher toll level induces larger land-use effects. While 
different tolls levels apparently change the magnitude of the results, it is not obvious a priori if 
the economic and land-use effects caused by different toll levels are qualitatively different. With 
LUSTRE, a comprehensive way to compare the qualitative aspects of a higher toll is to look at 
the welfare decomposition terms. Table 5b shows these terms evaluated at a toll of 470 cents, the 
optimal toll as identified by LUSTRE.  
Comparing Table 5b with Table 5a, we see that the toll revenue redistribution still 
constitutes a large portion of the welfare gain for the lowest quartile. The first quartile benefits 
the most from the higher toll. For the higher quartile groups, the change in wages still is the main 
conductor of welfare gains. The fourth quartile still is the most affected by the economic and 
land-use effects and by the change in commuting costs, as we already have observed under a 228 
cents toll. Changes in prices, rents, and costs of shopping have the same effects in term of signs, 
as well as in terms of relative magnitude across all quartile groups. However, the commuting 
costs affect individuals more adversely, particularly those in the top skill group. The rapid 
declines in their welfare gains, as observed on Figure 2b, can then be attributed to this factor. 
Overall, however, the signs of the welfare decomposition terms and most of their magnitudes 
relative to each other are similar for the 228-cents toll and the 470-cents toll. This suggests that 
the mechanisms behind economic and land-use effects are similar for the two tolls, so our 
analysis for the 228-cents toll also holds for the 470-cents toll. The difference in optimal toll 
level predominantly is driven by the labor market adjustments and the gains enjoyed by the 
lower quartile from the redistribution of the revenue.  
 
22Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have used LUSTRE, an integrated model of regional economy, land use, 
and transportation, in a realistic spatial context with differentiated representative agents to 
simulate the long-run effects of a particular congestion pricing scheme—a cordon toll—and have 
compared the welfare and distributional effects of this policy with the short-run effects obtained 
from the transportation module of the integrated model (START). The goal of the paper was to 
determine if adding extra layers of complexity to simple theoretical models can yield new 
insights about the effectiveness of congestion pricing in the long run.  
Four results stand out. First, although we found only modest long-term welfare gains 
(only about 0.05 percent of annual income on average for our representative agents), they were 
several times larger than the short-term welfare gains computed using START alone from the 
same policy. This result primarily is attributable to the response of the labor market. In LUSTRE, 
the cordon toll leads to higher unemployment, which translates into a scarcity of labor and 
therefore brings about higher wages. The wage increase is an important source of welfare gains 
that exceed welfare losses due to employment decline. Like Parry and Bento (2001), we have 
found that congestion pricing contributes to a reduction in labor hours and thus might exacerbate 
pre-existing deadweight losses from income taxes. However, in their work based on an aspatial 
representative agent model, Parry and Bento found that interactions of congestion pricing with 
the labor market would negatively affect resident/workers’ welfare unless the revenue proceeds 
are used to reduce labor taxes. In our case, a lump-sum distribution of toll revenues still brings 
positive welfare gains. This result holds for different parameterizations of the labor market 
response rate.  
Second, modeling several skill levels of economic agents reveals different mechanisms of 
welfare gains from congestion pricing for different representative agents. The major source of 
welfare gains from congestion pricing for upper skill levels is higher wages induced by tolls, 
while less skilled agents primarily enjoy the benefits of the redistributed toll revenues. As a 
consequence, given a choice, less skilled workers would favor higher tolls than their higher-
skilled counterparts. 
Third, our simulations show that although the welfare gains from congestion pricing are 
positive regardless of the choice of the toll redistribution scheme, the magnitude of the welfare 
gains is highly sensitive to the redistribution mechanism. This result seems to be in agreement 
with previous literature but more work is needed to gain a better understanding of the processes 
involved. 
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Finally, we find that while retail production in the cordoned area decreases slightly 
(0.008 percent), the effect is not significant for three reasons. First, customers like to shop near 
home, so the density of residents in and near the cordoned area protects retail activity. Second, 
retail firms in the core benefit from the lower costs of shopping travel resulting from decreased 
congestion. Third, people primarily shop during the off-peak and the afternoon peak hours, when 
the cordon is not in effect. The first and second reasons corroborate the arguments of proponents 
of the London cordon, though the third suggests that the concern over the time window of the toll 
was justified.  
Naturally, our results are limited by several modeling choices. Our simulations were 
conducted for a particular metropolitan area, for a particular congestion pricing policy, and with 
one predetermined scheme for the redistribution of the toll proceeds. Also, the costs of setting up 
the toll collection mechanism were ignored. Possible extensions of this work include using the 
present modeling framework to model other congestion pricing policies to determine the general 
robustness of the results obtained here and to gain more insight on the comparative advantages of 
various road-pricing policies. Another idea worth pursuing is to conduct a more careful analysis, 
in the same vein as Parry (2002), but using our more complex model, of the effect of a variety of 
redistribution schemes, especially schemes that are not lump-sum redistribution. Finally, the 
results of this model are constrained by the modeling choice of individual consumers/workers, 
not households. Introduction of households into the model would add another layer of 
complexity that should yield important insights on the long-term effects of congestion pricing. 
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Mathematical Appendix  
RELU 
In what follows, we will briefly describe mathematical structure of RELU.  
Consumers/Workers 
Consumers in RELU are exogenously distributed into F skill groups. While they cannot 
change their skill group, each consumer within a skill group can make a series of choices. After 
deciding whether to work or to stay unemployed, consumers choose a triple (i, j, k) 
corresponding to choices where to reside, work and what type of housing to choose9. Conditional 
on discrete choices, consumers decide how much housing to rent, how much retail goods to 
purchase at each available retail location and how much labor to supply.10  
We assume that the utility function of consumers is Cobb-Douglas between housing and 
aggregate consumption, while the sub-utility of all retail goods is CES. Then, the Marshallian 
consumer demands for retail goods and housing (for employed and unemployed consumers 
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=               ( A 2 a )  
                                                 
9 Unemployed consumers choose a pair (i,k). Alternatively, the choice of unemployment can be associated with an 
artificial workplace zone (say, j=0) 
10 Although in the model we do not have leisure, aggregate labor supply is elastic because of unemployment and 
variation in time spent traveling to shop. 
 








β    ( A 2 b )  
where  is full consumer income (net of taxes and commuting costs), M is unearned 
income component, 
Ψ
ψ is full price of consumer good, and ι’s are coefficients reflecting intrinsic 
attractiveness of shopping locations. The net full incomes and full prices of retail goods faced by 
the employed and unemployed are given in equations (A3) and (A4) below. 
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In the equations (A3-A4) g and G stand for one-way time and monetary transport costs 
respectively, ϑ is the income tax rate, and c is a coefficient reflecting the number of shopping 
trips required to purchase one unit of good. The portions of indirect utility functions common to 





ln ln ln ln ln
f
ff ff





ααββ β ι ψ
η
−− ⎛⎞ −




| E    (A5a) 
u
f ik z if z if z
f
f f
ik f f f f f f
u



























β β β α α    (A5b) 
where coefficients E measure intrinsic attractiveness of (i, j, k) bundles. Assuming that 
idiosyncratic utilities in this model are ~ i.i.d. Gumbel with dispersion parameter f λ , we arrive at 
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Equation (A7) shows components of unearned income – income from capital, income 
from real estate and income inflow from outside of the region.  
11
fj
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Producers 
The producers in the model are perfectly competitive profit maximizers, with a Cobb-
Douglas production function between four large groups of inputs – labor, capital, buildings, and 
intermediate inputs. At the same time, within input groups, (by analogy with consumers) inputs 
feature constant elasticity of substitution. The input demands for labor, buildings, capital and 
intermediate inputs are shown in equations (A8)-(A11), where 
κ, χ, and υ are coefficients reflecting intrinsic attractiveness of particular labor, building, 
and intermediate inputs.  
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In equation (A11)  denotes full price of intermediate input inclusive of freight costs.   ˆ p
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Landlords 
The model of landlord behavior helps to explain the short-run supply of floor space in 
buildings. Assuming that idiosyncratic portions of building maintenance costs are i.i.d. Gumbel 
with a dispersion parameter ϕ, and that costs common to all landlords are denoted by D, the 
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Respectively, equation (A12) computes expected rental profit from a unit of floor space. 
Developers 
By analogy with the landlord model, the model of developers describes optimal rules of 
constructing and demolishing buildings. Assuming that idiosyncratic costs related to construction 
and demolition are i.i.d. Gumbel with dispersion coefficient Φ, equation (A14) shows the 
probability that a profit-maximizing developer will decide to construct a new property on a unit 
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11 Here we present a static, stationary version of the model 
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General Equilibrium 
General Equilibrium is formed by seven sets of conditions: 
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Labor market clearing  
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Residential floor space clearing  
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Business floor space and agricultural land clearing  
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Goods market clearing  
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Stock adjustment 
For k >0:          ( A 2 1 a )   00 0 ik ik ik i i k SQ m SQ = 0
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where 
W : Total welfare 
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where  
TRD ∆ : Toll revenue and additional transit fares collected and redistributed lump sum 
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where  
z pℜ ∆ : Change in retail prices 
Rent 

















| β         (B5) 
where  
R ∆ : Change in rents 
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where 
working G ∆ : Change in cost of commuting trips, time elements converted in monetary units, 
weighted by the numbers of trips made in the reference versus the simulation.  




















∂ ∑∑ ∑ |
|
|
|      (B7) 
where 
shopping G ∆ : Change in cost of shopping trips, time elements converted in monetary units, 
weighted by the numbers of trips made in the reference versus the simulation.  
 
34Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
Tables 
Table 1: Population Distribution for LUSTRE Baseline 












Quartile 3    (relative 
to active population)
Quartile 4    (relative 
to active population)
Total    (relative to 
active population)
All Study Area
Quartile 1    (relative 
to active population)
Quartile 2    (relative 
to active population)
 
b) Population Distribution for the Downtown Core 
Workers from All Zones













Quartile 1    (relative 
to active population)
Quartile 2    (relative 
to active population)
Quartile 3    (relative 
to active population)
Quartile 4    (relative 
to active population)
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Table 2: Wage and Income Information for LUSTRE Baseline 
Average Net 
Income*           
(2000$/year)
Average Gross 





Quartile 1 15779 6.8 14.3%
Quartile 2 25815 14.1 16.6%
Quartile 3 43943 22.5 22.3%
Quartile 4 91805 47.0 31.5%
 
*Net of taxes and commuting costs 
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Table 3: Trips Distribution for LUSTRE Baseline 
a) Distribution over Time Periods 
 
Commuting 




Trips   
(Thousands
/Day)








Trips    
(Thousands 
/Day) 
All Trips    
(Thousands
/Day)
AM Peak  1454 321 1775 226 11  238
PMPeak  60 883 943 6 24  30
Off Peak  908 1090 1998 108 31  139
Total 2423  2294 4716 341 66  407
All Study 
A
Ending in Downtown 
C
AM Peak : From 6:30 am to 9:30 am
PM Peak : From 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm  
b) Distribution over Mode of Transportation 
 
Commuting 




Trips   
(Thousands
/Day)








Trips    
(Thousands 
/Day) 
All Trips   
(Thousands
/Day)
Bus  86 32 118 29 15 45
Rail  234 13 246 163 7  169
SOV  1641 997 2638 91 10  101
HOV  291 1109 1401 40 14  54
Walking / 
Bikin
171 142 313 18 21  39
HOV : High Occupancy 
All Study 
A
Ending in Downtown 
C
SOV : Single Occupancy 
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Table 4: Welfare Gains and Revenue Collected Under LUSTRE and START for a 
Downtown Cordon 
a) Total Welfare Gains and Revenue Collected 
START 228 (optimum) 14165 33682 12172
LUSTRE 228 76193 33921 12776
470 (optimum) 91217 45812 21131
Toll           




Gains           
(Thousands of 
2000$/year) .








b) Welfare Gains per Capita 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Total
START 228 (optimum) 13.0 -1.2 -4.0 2.3 3.4
LUSTRE 228 19.6 16.5 14.4 29.1 18.4
470 (optimum) 26.8 21.2 14.7 27.9 22.0
Welfare Gains per Capita (2000$/year)         Toll           
(2000 cents)   
………………
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Table 5: Welfare Decomposition under LUSTRE for a Downtown Cordon
















Term       
……...
Quartile 1 19.6 5.5 17.3 6.1 -5.3 -0.92 -1.80 -0.34 -0.9
Quartile 2 16.5 16.2 12.3 4.3 -7.8 -1.5 -5.5 0.04 -1.5
Quartile 3 14.4 29.3 10.9 3.8 -12.6 -2.8 -11.0 0.347 -3.5
Quartile 4 29.0 64.5 15.7 5.5 -24.4 -6.4 -18.1 3.3 -11.1
All Quartiles 18.4 21.8 14.0 4.9 -10.2 -2.3 -7.3 0.4 -3.0
Welfare 
Gains       





















Term       
……...
Quartile 1 26.8 6.9 24.8 6.4 -6.4 -0.81 -2.48 -0.43 -1.1
Quartile 2 21.2 20.5 17.6 4.5 -9.5 -1.3 -8.8 -0.07 -1.8
Quartile 3 14.7 36.8 15.6 4.0 -15.2 -2.6 -19.6 -0.26 -4.2
Quartile 4 27.9 82.5 22.6 5.8 -29.5 -6.2 -37.8 3.8 -13.4
All Quartiles 22.0 27.6 20.1 5.2 -12.4 -2.1 -13.1 0.2 -3.6
Welfare  
Gains       
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Table 6: Changes in Trip Numbers relative to Baseline under LUSTRE and START Downtown 
Cordon (228 cents) 
a) By Period of Travel 
Trips to    
Downtown Core   
… (% change) 
All Other 
Trips       
(% change) 
All Trips    
(% change) 
……..……
Trips to    
Downtown Core   
… (% change) 
All Other 
Trips       
(% change) 
All Trips    
(% change) 
……..……
AM Peak -8.3 -0.59 -1.3 -8.6 -0.60 -1.4
PM Peak 3.0 0.19 0.32 2.6 0.21 0.32
Off Peak 3.1 0.10 0.34 2.9 0.13 0.35
Total -0.028 -0.015 -0.016 -0.27 0.005 -0.015
LUSTRE                                     
AM Peak : From 6:30 am to 9:30 am
PM Peak : From 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm
Off Peak : Rest of the day
START                                                    
 
b) By Mode of Transportation 
Trips to    
Downtown Core   
… (% change) 
All Other 
Trips       
(% change) 
All Trips    
(% change) 
……..……
Trips to    
Downtown Core   
… (% change) 
All Other 
Trips       
(% change) 
All Trips    
(% change) 
……..……
Bus 6.1 -0.42 2.3 5.6 0.037 2.4
Rail 6.5 0.73 4.4 6.1 1.8 4.6
SOV -10.1 -0.15 -0.57 -10.0 -0.16 -0.57
HOV 2.5 0.11 0.17 2.2 0.14 0.19
Walking / 
Biking
1.2 0.26 0.53 0.89 0.13 0.35
START                                                          LUSTRE                                     
SOV : Single Occupancy Vehicle
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Table 7: Changes in Income and Consumption by Work Status Relative to Baseline under 
LUSTRE, Downtown Cordon (228 cents)  











Income Net of Taxes 

















Amount of Goods & 
Services Consumed 
(% change)
Amount of Housing 
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Table 8: Welfare Gains for Sensitivity Tests 
a) Total Welfare Gains 
START
Redistribution 
to Quartile 1 
Only 
Redistribution 
to Quartile 2 
Only 
Redistribution 
to Quartile 3 
Only 
Redistribution 
to Quartile 4 
Only 
Redistribution 
to all Quartiles 
……...
Redistribution 
to all Quartiles 
……...
Total 56764 171138 103186 43636 76193 14165
Total Welfare Gains (Thousands of 2000$/year)
LUSTRE
 
b) Welfare Gains per Capita 
START
Redistribution 
to Quartile 1 
Only
Redistribution 
to Quartile 2 
Only 
Redistribution 
to Quartile 3 
Only 
Redistribution 
to Quartile 4 
Only 
Redistribution 
to all Quartiles 
……...
Redistribution 
to all Quartiles 
……...
Quartile 1 37.5 1.7 1.7 0.41 19.6 13.0
Quartile 2 -0.025 144.4 3.3 -0.57 16.5 -1.2
Quartile 3 -1.3 12.9 70.7 -2.1 14.4 -4.0
Quartile 4 6.2 35.2 20.6 97.7 29.1 2.3
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Figures
Figure 1: Region Representation of Washington Metropolitan Area in LUSTRE 
a) Spatial Disaggregation and Major Road 
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Figure 2: Welfare Gains under LUSTRE and START for a Downtown Cordon 
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Figure 3: Changes in Average Trip Travel Time by Origin under LUSTRE  Relative to 
Baseline, Downtown Cordon (228 cents) 
 
     Central districts   
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Figure 4: Changes in Average Commuting Costs, LUSTRE Relative to Baseline, 
Downtown Cordon (228 cents) 
a) Commuting Costs by Home Zone 
 
b) Commuting Costs by Work Zone 
.   
Central districts  
   Central districts   
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Figure 5: Changes in Average Costs of Shopping Trips, LUSTRE Relative to Baseline, 
Downtown Cordon (228 cents)  
a) Shopping Costs by Home Zone 
. .     
b) Shopping Costs by Shopping Zone 
 
Central districts   
Central districts   
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Figure 6: Changes in Overall Travel Costs, LUSTRE Relative to Baseline, Downtown 
Cordon (228 cents) 
a) Transportation Costs by Home Zone 
 
b) Transportation Costs by Destination Zone 
 
 Central districts   
Central districts   
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Figure 7: Changes in Average Wage Rate, LUSTRE Relative to Baseline, Downtown 
Cordon (228 cents)  
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Figure 8: Changes in Residential Pattern of Population, Residential Rents, LUSTRE 
Relative to Baseline, Downtown Cordon (228 cents)  
a) Population Change 
                                                      
. . 
b) Residential Rents 
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 Central districts   
 
50Resources for the Future  Safirova et al. 
Figure 9: Changes in Output and Prices, Production Sector, LUSTRE Relative to 
Baseline, Downtown Cordon (228 cents)
 
a) Real Output of Retail Sector 
 




b) Real Output of Primary Industries 
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